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Maintenance Error Management System

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In civvy PART 145 companies (or the 147 training colleges / others ) that do formal HF training, the relevent MEMS info is disceminated as part of an initial HF course (of 2 days duration) and refresher courses every two years of half a day. All staff working in a 145 org are expected to receive this training by the CAA (its part of the requirements to hold such an approval). All connies have to hold a valid cert before a company will consider them for employment. Not knowing what Lyneham have done in the way of HF, I know that the CAA expect CAP 716 tutors to have formal training beforehand. (the civvy standard course is a week long I believe and ain't cheap).

BAe at Marham work to Mil 145, that is why they do the HF courses to CAP 716 standard. The HF course I did followed the various facets of HF (Shell model interactions, human senses and effects on them, fatigue, stress, peer pressure, drink (RAFs biggest HF??) and drugs effects, enviromental pressures, norms and violations etc and placed them into the various senarios of real accidents such as the Alhoa 737 cabin roof fatigue failure (engineers failing to see fatigue cracks on a high cycle 737 combined with a lack of fatigue info on the effects of high frequency cycles rates by Boeing), The Alaskan MD83 crash in the pacific (where the stab trin ballscrew broke up due to lack of maintenance care / extensions to lube cycles by the operator/ faiure of the crew to land the aircraft when the problem first mainfested itself before total failure), the Brit Midland 737 double engine failure due to missing mag chip seals, the Valley Hawk aileron disconnect (bad work recording/badly writtern instructions) and the BAC 1-11 windscreen blow out (violantion by engineer / bad stock holding control etc.) The senarios were discussed in groups against the background of the HF involved in each case. The reasons for company MEMS was towards the end of the second day stating the routes to take, relevent people to contact, way of feedback return and other gen concerning it. A test was held at the end to check understanding.

That was BAe's course and from what I've heard from others it was exactly the same as the industry standard ones..

Hope that helps..
 
I'm in a training cell now and a selected number of the instructors are the ones who pass the 'word' around personnel at the same time as their human factors brief.
This is one of my problems with this sort of thing, there is no cohesive strategy throughout the RAF to deliver the product. It is dumped in our laps and we are told to make it work with little or no support from the companies who sell the product as they have already made their fast buck. It has happened before and it will happen again when MEMS falls out of favour or a new buzz phrase comes into fashion.

I think we crossed post/edit. I agree with you until the system is in place to accept and implement these changes bringing in any new system is pointless.

Slightly Off Topic how often do you see this on new bits of kit people who by virtue of rank get the proper training, ie from the civvy manufacturers yet would never use the kit? Meanwhile the junior ranks who use the kit make do the second hand info. This isn't a rant at seniors, just surely the most amount of appropiate info surely should go to those who use the kit day in day out?
 
The overiding message i gave gleamed from my HF brief as a JNCO is that if i deviate from a MP one tiny bit I will have commited a willful folly. Bring on tommorrow and the work to rule !
 
And EVERBODY does the same training.. They did at Marham (from the OC's to the SAC(T). Civvy Street is no exception, an LAE that has done module 9 will still have to do the company course / continuation training as the Mechs (usually more contituation training due to his status) and hold the valid certs if he is a connie..
 
Was that at CMU? Because I'm fairly sure it's not the case outside of CMU.

Everybody in the outside world does the same training and BAe followed suit because it was part of the MIL 145 setup they signed up to as an MoD contractor. Yeph it was that ****hole of a maintenance facility

If every different RAF OC Forward has a different idea to approach such training... well, what is best practice to them??

My solution to the precieved problem..

HF initial training SHOULD be bolted onto basic trade training.. The rest of the RAF (including stackers etc, because they are in the loop) should be done at Station level on an ad hoc (soon as possible, but practicable) rate. Refresher courses would be easy enough to be done by training cells then. Common MEMS format reporting across the RAF. A structured and set level of what needs to go up the chain / come down and relevent feedback gets dished out by trade TMs (with the bods signing for reading them).

Sorted...

And training cell guys get the proper training..
 
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I don't know about large companies like BA, but in most civvy companies most of the shop floor doesn't get MEMS 'training'. Even fewer get MEDA training.

All the Shop Floor get is a quick familiarisation/reminder that MEMS exists during their two-yearly HF refresher and Continuation Training for Maintenance Authorisation renewals. (I believe the RAF still doesn't do CT?)

The MEMS Report Forms are basically a blank Sheet with a letterhead and few basic details blocks on it to make it as easy to complete as possible. They are distributed about the hangars, workshops and offices so that they are freely available for all to use - often they have pre-adressed envelopes to aid confidential or anonymous reporting.(depends on the size of the company)

Generally, the only people that have MEMS/MEDA training are those who are going to use the system or do investigations. Others only have to know it's there to be used.

The best example of open MEMS reporting that I've seen was at Schiphol where the Dutch workers reported almost everything they did! They could do it because, under Dutch Employment Laws, you can't sack anyone (easily!) even if they do "misdemeanors".

And I agree with you, wgaf, if any system is not complete you shouln't start teaching it, let alone using it.

Unlike many predecessor systems MEMS is part of a mandated regulation so wont dissappear into the fog of time until major regulations change. ICAO took ten years to mandate MEMS, so it wont change it's mind overnight.
 
The overiding message i gave gleamed from my HF brief as a JNCO is that if i deviate from a MP one tiny bit I will have commited a willful folly. Bring on tommorrow and the work to rule !

No, you have commited a violation.. However it may not be intentional!!:PDT_Xtremez_30:

Violations happen all the time.. Everywhere.. Wrong tools, No tools, enviromental and operational pressures.. Happens in Civvy Street all the time, however, its knowing such a violation can end up as an accident.

The guy who fitted the BAC 1-11 windscreen, took on a job that could have waited in a can do enviroment of people. He was told by the storeman that the screws he wanted were the wrong ones for the job but there weren't any. He took screws from a C stores bin (uncontrolled) and visually checked them in a dark room, not wearing his glasses. He didn't check the finished work properly as he was required for other supervision tasks (he was the shift supervisor by the way!) The manufacturer of the kite didn't specify a pressure check post screen change (that would have failed!). A plane could have been lost easily, the Captains escape was Houdini!!

The Valley Hawk. A bloke deviates from a badly worded SI due to a norm work round that is commonly used. His boss takes him off the task and replaces him with another.. No hand over and no paperwork for what was disconnected, Man B rapes up job to SI.. Pilot rushes his preflight check and doesn't do a control check.. He dies.
 
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I don't know about large companies like BA, but in most civvy companies most of the shop floor doesn't get MEMS 'training'. Even fewer get MEDA training.

All the Shop Floor get is a quick familiarisation/reminder that MEMS exists during their two-yearly HF refresher and Continuation Training for Maintenance Authorisation renewals. (I believe the RAF still doesn't do CT?)

Generally, the only people that have MEMS/MEDA training are those who are going to use the system or do investigations. Others only have to know it's there to be used.

My cert runs out next month and I'll wait to see what my new companies HF refresher is like.. If its like their SFAR 88 level one training, it is going to be dire!! BAes MEMS brief was as you have indicated..
 
Downloaded from the Boeing website:

Human Factors Process for Reducing Maintenance Errors


As a result of the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas, the Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) process offered by Boeing is now available to operators of Douglas-designed commercial airplanes and their maintenance organizations. Since its introduction two years ago, a growing number of maintenance organizations for Boeing-designed airplanes have adopted MEDA, which is a tool for investigating the factors that contribute to maintenance errors. MEDA provides a comprehensive approach for conducting thorough and consistent investigations, determining the factors that lead to an error, and making suggested improvements to reduce the likelihood of future errors.
Maintenance errors cost operators of commercial airplanes millions of dollars each year in rework and lost revenue, and present potential safety concerns. For example, aviation industry studies indicate that as many as 20 percent of all in-flight engine shut downs and up to 50 percent of all engine-related flight delays and cancellations can be traced to maintenance error. In response, Boeing developed the MEDA process to help maintenance organizations identify why these errors occur and how to prevent them in the future. Successful implementation of MEDA requires an understanding of the following:

1. The MEDA philosophy.

2. The MEDA process.

3. Management resolve.

4. Implementing MEDA.

5. The benefits of MEDA.

The MEDA Philosophy
Traditional efforts to investigate errors are often aimed at identifying the employee who made the error. The usual result is that the employee is defensive and is subjected to a combination of disciplinary action and recurrent training (which is actually retraining). Because retraining often adds little or no value to what the employee already knows, it may be ineffective in preventing future errors. In addition, by the time the employee is identified, information about the factors that contributed to the error has been lost. Because the factors that contributed to the error remain unchanged, the error is likely to recur, setting what is called the "blame and train" cycle in motion again.

To break this cycle, the maintenance organization's MEDA investigators learn to look for the factors that contributed to the error, rather than the employee who made the error. The MEDA philosophy is based on these principles:

Positive employee intent (maintenance technicians want to do the best job possible and do not make errors intentionally).
Contribution of multiple factors (a series of factors contributes to an error).
Manageability of errors (most of the factors that contribute to an error can be managed).
POSITIVE EMPLOYEE INTENT.
This principle is key to a successful investigation. Traditional "blame and train" investigations assume that errors result from individual carelessness or incompetence. Starting instead from the assumption that even careful employees can make errors, MEDA interviewers can gain the active participation of the technicians closest to the error. When technicians feel that their competence is not in question and that their contributions will not be used in disciplinary actions against them or their fellow employees, they willingly team with investigators to identify the factors that contribute to error and suggest solutions. By following this principle, operators can replace a negative "blame and train" pattern with a positive "blame the process, not the person" practice.
CONTRIBUTION OF MULTIPLE FACTORS.
Technicians who perform maintenance tasks on a daily basis are often aware of factors that can contribute to error. These include information that is difficult to understand, such as work cards or maintenance manuals; inadequate lighting; poor communication between work shifts; and airplane design. Technicians may even have their own strategies for addressing these factors. One of the objectives of a MEDA investigation is to discover these successful strategies and share them with the entire maintenance operation.

MANAGEABILITY OF ERRORS.
Active involvement of the technicians closest to the error reflects the MEDA principle that most of the factors that contribute to an error can be managed. Processes can be changed, procedures improved or corrected, facilities enhanced, and best practices shared. Because error most often results from a series of contributing factors, correcting or removing just one or two of these factors can prevent the error from recurring.

The MEDA Process
To help maintenance organizations achieve the dual goals of identifying factors that contribute to existing errors and avoiding future errors, Boeing initially worked with British Airways, Continental Airlines, United Airlines, a maintenance workers' labor union, and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. The result was a basic five-step process for operators to follow (see figure 1 for process flow):

Event.
Decision.
Investigation.
Prevention strategies.
Feedback.
EVENT.
An event occurs, such as a gate return or air turn back. It is the responsibility of the maintenance organization to select the error-caused events that will be investigated.
DECISION.
After fixing the problem and returning the airplane to service, the operator makes a decision: Was the event maintenance-related? If yes, the operator performs a MEDA investigation.

INVESTIGATION.
Using the MEDA results form, the operator carries out an investigation. The trained investigator uses the form to record general information about the airplane, when the maintenance and the event occurred, the event that began the investigation, the error that caused the event (see "Maintenance Errors" for common examples), the factors contributing to the error, and a list of possible prevention strategies.

PREVENTION STRATEGIES.
The operator reviews, prioritizes, implements, and then tracks prevention strategies (process improvements) in order to avoid or reduce the likelihood of similar errors in the future.

FEEDBACK.
The operator provides feedback to the maintenance workforce so technicians know that changes have been made to the maintenance system as a result of the MEDA process. The operator is responsible for affirming the effectiveness of employees' participation and validating their contribution to the MEDA process by sharing investigation results with them.

Management Resolve
The resolve of management at the maintenance operation is key to successful MEDA implementation. Specifically, after completing a program of MEDA support from Boeing, managers must assume responsibility for the following activities before starting investigations:

1. Appoint a manager in charge of MEDA and assign a focal organization.

2. Decide which events will initiate investigations.

3. Establish a plan for conducting and tracking investigations.

4. Assemble a team to decide which prevention strategies to implement.

5. Inform the maintenance and engineering workforce about MEDA before implementation.

MEDA is a long-term commitment, rather than a quick fix. Operators new to the process are susceptible to "normal workload syndrome." This occurs once the enthusiasm generated by initial training of investigation teams has diminished and the first few investigations have been completed. In addition to the expectation that they will continue to use MEDA, newly trained investigators are expected to maintain their normal responsibilities and workloads. Management at all levels can maintain the ongoing commitment required by providing systematic tracking of MEDA findings and visibility of error and improvement trends.

Implementing MEDA
Many operators have decided to use MEDA initially for investigations of serious, high-visibility events, such as in-flight shut downs and air turn backs. It is easy to track the results of such investigations, and the potential "payback" is very noticeable.

In contrast, according to David Hall, deputy regional manager in the British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Safety Regulation Group, a high-visibility event may not present the best opportunity to investigate error. The attention of operators' upper management and regulatory authorities could be intimidating to those involved in the process. In addition, the intensity of a high-level investigation may generate too many possible contributing factors to allow a clear-cut investigation of the event.

Hall has recommended that operators look at the broader potential for improvement by using MEDA to track the cumulative effects of less-visible errors. Providing management visibility of the most frequently occurring errors can, in the long run, produce profound improvements by interrupting the series of contributing factors. According to Dr. Jim Reason, professor of psychology at the University of Manchester, MEDA is "a good example of a measuring tool capable of identifying accident-producing factors before they combine to cause a bad event."

Benefits
About 60 operators have already implemented some or all of the MEDA process. Participating airlines have reported several benefits, including the following improvements:

A 16 percent reduction in mechanical delays.
Revised and improved maintenance procedures and airline work processes.
A reduction in airplane damage through improved towing and headset procedures.
Changes in the disciplinary culture of operations.
Elimination of an engine servicing error by purchasing a filter-removal tool that had not previously been available where the service was being performed.
Improvements in line maintenance workload planning.
A program to reduce on-the-job accidents and injuries based on the MEDA results form and investigation methods




As this is public access information - I'm sure you can use it for teaching the troops!
Rigga
 
More or less word for word what we are given.
I am sure that it will work in industry, given time. However, the whole system makes no allowances for the anomalies of the military world and the RAF in particular. It is merely a reinvention of the wheel and as I have said before it will soon go out of fashion in the military world when the new buzz phrase, that some air rank has heard whilst talking to his chums in the gentlemans club, comes into focus. Just my opinion.
 
Somebody mentioned Haddon Cave a few posts ago , that comes out this month and I think this is the start of the recomendations to be put in place. the 2 definately go together and already its been mandatory to turn up to these meetings. I think we are in for a few more big shake ups very very soon.
 
Apart from those occasions on operations, when something may be done outside the regs (Even then it should still be mandated).RAF airworthiness is no worse & in the case of some airlines,its better than the civvy world. In ‘most’ situations a/c are maintained & operated to very similar standards & with the advent of Mechanical & Avionic in the RAF the break down of trade responsibility between civvy & Mil is virtually identical.
Some approaches to maintenance differ, both have their merits. Bad examples I can think of are, tool control in civvy maintenance,which can be diabolical, equally the fact that the RAF has not adopted the ETOPS maintenance philosophy is bizarre.
HF & (M)EMS/MEDA are not completely new or revolutionary ideas. A MEDA is just a tool for recording information in a standard format it is a part of the process which may not always be required.MEDA investigators are trained to look for the factors that contributed to the error, rather than for those who made the error.
MEMS is the crux of the new stuff its replacing 'all' the old reporting systems.In that sense it’s a long overdue. It’s a simple system/idea which if used, can work; it works well in most civilian organisations.
The main benefit of using it (that I see), is a shifting of the responsibility for issues up & onto the correct shoulders. If you are working with unnecessary risk i.e. in anyway outside the book/system & something goes 'badly' wrong your @rse is not covered. If you identify & report the problem, it remains a problem, but is no longer your responsibility & ultimately it may even be resolved!
The attitude of, 'we've always had these problems, we have reported them & nothing ever happens, it’s not worth doing it again, is termed 'learned helplessness' & is prevalent in organizations where systems don’t work well. How many people ever used a Condor, Murphy or HFOR anyway? I know in the case of HFOR people have been made to fill them in as a sort of punishment.
Taking recent events into account & the possible outcomes of Haddon Cave, inactivity, inaction & inertia by the the airships will become totally indefensible & in some cases criminal.
Its understandable to be cynical about what’s seen as just another passing fad,the RAF has been caned by cuts,overstretch & leaning, but there is a seismic shift about to occur,& if MEMS is put to good use it can play a big part in giving the shop floor an input into managing risk & effecting change.
But WTF do I know!
 
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MEMS is the crux of the new stuff its replacing 'all' the old reporting systems. In that sense it’s a long overdue. It’s a simple system/idea which if used, can work; it works well in most civilian organisations.

Well stated Shunko - you obviously know more than you say.

The quote above seems to indicate the error made in implementing MEMS to the RAF - MEMS appears to have been added to the list of other systems and not replacing any of them!

Where I work ALL occurence reports are now made using ONE form (an "Occurence Report Form") QA then sort out what is needed and where to report it (H&S, MOR, MEMS, NCR, etc) or investigate it. We use the occurence report to raise QA audit NCR's too.
We also investigate reports to the Root Cause and try to find a preventive action.

By doing this QA has a central record of all occurences and can analyse all the trends in any stand-alone system.
 
The quote above seems to indicate the error made in implementing MEMS to the RAF - MEMS appears to have been added to the list of other systems and not replacing any of them!

I believe there are two forms MEMS plus one other (I forget the name) and there are rules to which one you fill in, depending on the issue, which isn't clear. But then there are the old F760/765 still knocking about, just to confuse things.
 
It will replace all other reporting methods.
Rigga not sure about your OCR form,not come across it.
Duffman,there will be just one form on which to report with MEMS,the only other form that may be required is the MEDA.
I've heard 'some' good feedback from units where its gone live.Its reckoned that on average,it can take up to 2 years for people to fully engage with the system.
 
I believe there are two forms MEMS plus one other (I forget the name) and there are rules to which one you fill in, depending on the issue, which isn't clear. But then there are the old F760/765 still knocking about, just to confuse things.

F760.. Defective spares issued.

F765.. Unsatisfactory Air Publication details.

Both used on a wider parameter of assets and documentation than purely aircraft related. True they tye up with maintenance error issues in the military, but they ae not used to record incidents etc. are they?
 
Bad examples I can think of are, tool control in civvy maintenance,which can be diabolical, equally the fact that the RAF has not adopted the ETOPS maintenance philosophy is bizarre.

I would agree on that. I asked about the requirement of my company for an inventory of my tools (other MROs do request it) and they couldn't care less. MROs however do have mandatory inspections for "Clear to Fit" before panels are re installed. Also they don't require people to etch their tools either (some people won't anyway cos it effects the warrenty). ETOPS philosophy is as valid for an FJ transit across the pond as it is for a 737/A330. If the aircraft is flying outside a 60 minute one engine range of an airfield over sea, then it does make sense.
 
F760.. Defective spares issued.

F765.. Unsatisfactory Air Publication details.

Both used on a wider parameter of assets and documentation than purely aircraft related. True they tye up with maintenance error issues in the military, but they ae not used to record incidents etc. are they?

Yes they do cover a wider area, but they still mudder the waters some what. Defining which one is used when isn't an impossible task but it will cause a few problems to some no doubt. What if an incident was caused by a defective spare or a rubbish AP, which would you fill in? Or would you need to fill both in?
 
Well stated Shunko - you obviously know more than you say.

The quote above seems to indicate the error made in implementing MEMS to the RAF - MEMS appears to have been added to the list of other systems and not replacing any of them!

Where I work ALL occurence reports are now made using ONE form (an "Occurence Report Form") QA then sort out what is needed and where to report it (H&S, MOR, MEMS, NCR, etc) or investigate it. We use the occurence report to raise QA audit NCR's too.
We also investigate reports to the Root Cause and try to find a preventive action.

By doing this QA has a central record of all occurences and can analyse all the trends in any stand-alone system.

Now if we did that, it would be real progress!
 
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